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INTRODUCTION
Television broadcasters who hoped retransmission consent
would bring them immediate cash were disappointed by the first
round of negotiations with cable systems. By the October 1993
deadline for concluding retransmission negotiations, few stations
had been able to extract cash payments for allowing cable systems
to retransmit their broadcasts.' In the short term, at least, the
"second revenue stream" 2 predicted to result from retransmission
consent had been merely wishful thinking.
While retransmission consent did not produce immediate
cash, it did provide many broadcasters with new opportunities to
cash in on their production of local programs Those opportuni-
ties, in the form of new local cable channels, come with substan-
tial risk. It is expensive to start up a cable service, and profits in
this competitive arena are no sure thing. However, retransmission
consent for the first time gives television broadcasters a substantial
property right in their local programming. This property right
could make it attractive for stations to produce more-and more
diverse-local news and information programming.
For half a century, lawmakers have searched for the carrot
or the stick that would encourage American television stations to
produce more local news and information programs. From the
vague "public interest" standard of the Communications Act4 to
the almost comical precision of a list of nineteen categories of
community leaders whom broadcasters were to interview in their
efforts to ascertain community needs,5 Congress and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) have
struggled to infuse the spirit of community service into the
commercial world of American broadcasting.
1. Joe Flint, Stations Stay for No Pay, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 11, 1993,
at 6, 6.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988).
5. In re Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Brdcst. Applicants,
First Report and Order, 57 F.C.C.2d 418, app. B at 442 (1975).
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It has never worked. Despite cumbersome application forms
and perpetually raised eyebrows, in practice the FCC has rarely
granted a license, and even more rarely denied a license renewal,
on the basis of local news programming.6 Thus, American
commercial broadcasters have never had a compelling regulatory
reason to treat local news programming as anything more than a
token-a symbolic exchange for the privilege of a license.
The incentive for broadcasting local news and information,
like other programming, must come instead from its ability to
attract viewers and advertisers. Traditionally, television stations
have survived only by maximizing ratings, not by narrowcasting
or niche marketing.7 Broadcast television is not a cost-efficient
way for advertisers to reach narrow audiences.' Narrow audiences
may be eager enough for specialized local news and information
to pay for it directly, but broadcasters have no physical connection
to their viewers and thus no way to charge end-users for the
privilege of watching specialized programming.
Programming was the "freebie" that, in David Samoff's early
vision, would induce consumers to buy the "Radio Music Box."9
The tangible box, of course, had value to the industry as a product
to be sold and to the consumer as a product to be purchased. But
the programming the box would receive was as free as the air over
which it was transmitted. Even as broadcasting matured into an
advertising medium, local news and information, in and of
themselves, had no value to the broadcaster beyond their ability to
attract large audiences. They certainly had no resale value.
6. ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 112
(1973).
7. Id. at 50.
8. Id. at 10.
9. ToM LEWIS, EMPIRE OF THE AiR: THE MAN WHO MADE RADIO 116 (1991).
Sarnoff s proposal for the Radio Music Box cited sales of radios as the chief source of
revenue, accompanied by sales of subscriptions to programming guides. Id. While
Samoff's legend was built, in part, on his having "foreseen" as early as 1915 the
potential to use wireless for home entertainment, there is evidence that the Radio Music
Box memo may not have been written until 1920, "when broadcasting was literally
around the comer." Louise M. Benjamin, In Search of the Sarnoff "Radio Music Box"
Memo, 37 J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 325, 326 (1993).
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Broadcasters, unlike filmmakers, thought of air time, rather
than content, as their product. Perhaps it is an exaggeration to
claim that to commercial broadcasters programming is simply the
stuff that goes around commercial spots. But broadcasters'
copyright in local news and information, with no resale value and
no ability to generate revenue from end-users, has never had much
practical value as intellectual property. Ironically, cable's ability
to generate end-user revenue, combined with television stations'
growing need to diversify their income sources, could for the first
time make local news programming salable intellectual property
in its own right-apart from its ability to garner large ratings.
This Article will trace the history of the broadcasters' battle
to control cable's use of their signals. It will examine the courts'
early rulings on copyright and cable retransmission and the FCC's
attempts to provide copyright substitutes in the form of protective
regulations. It will examine the 1976 revision of the copyright
law,"° which provided a compulsory licensing system as a
compromise that gave a measure of compensation to program
suppliers, but left local broadcast stations uncompensated." It
will also look at the Cable Act of 1992,12 which for the first time
gave broadcasters the ability to control cable retransmission of
their signals. 3 This Article will examine the technological and
economic changes that have altered the relationship between cable
and broadcast television. Finally, it will consider ways in which
the shift in the law of intellectual property may create a climate
in which broadcasters have new economic incentives to produce
more-and more varied-local news.
10. Copyrights Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988)).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1988).
12. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A §§ 521-611
(West. Supp. 1994)).
13. 47 U.S.C.A. § 325 (b)(1) (West Supp. 1994).
[Vol. 46
RETRANSMISSION CONSENT
I. THE BURGEONING IMPORTANCE OF
END-USER SPENDING
Until the mid-1980s the American communications industry
(including television, cable, radio, recorded music, newspapers,
books, magazines, and movies) depended almost equally on
advertising revenues and end-user spending.14 However, from
1985 to 1990 end-user spending, driven largely by cable, compact
discs, and videocassette recorders, emerged as a significantly
greater source of revenue than advertising spending. During those
years the three media with the largest increases in usage were
basic cable, recorded music, and home video--all dependent
largely on end-user spending. 15 From 1986 to 1990 the com-
pound annual growth rate of advertiser spending in all communi-
cations industry sectors was 5.7 percent.1 6 By comparison, the
compound annual growth rate of end-user spending during that
same period was 10.2 percent.' 7 In 1985 advertising spending and
end-user spending were about equal: advertising spending
accounted for some $63 billion and end-user spending for just less
than $65 billion of the total $128 billion in communications
industry revenue.'8 By 1990 advertising spending had increased
to roughly $83 billion, while end-user spending had soared to over
$105 billion-more than 56 percent of communications industry
revenue.' 9 By 1995 advertising spending is expected to increase
to about $112 billion and end-user spending to almost $151 billion
per year.20 Thus, by 1995 end-user spending will account for
more than 57 percent of the total communications industry pie."-
It is no wonder that broadcasters, heretofore totally dependent on
14. THE VERONIS, SUHLER & ASSOCIATES COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY FORECAST
22 (5th ed. 1991) [hereinafter VERONIS, SUHLER].
15. Id. at 13.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 12.
21. Id. at 22-23.
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advertising revenues, seek to find a way to capitalize on the
growing importance of end-user spending.
II. CABLE AS A CONSUMER SERVICE
Cable began as a viewer-funded antenna service, not as an
advertiser-funded medium.22 Thus, cable focused first on its
ability to charge end-users based on their perception of program-
ming value. Cable now enjoys a dual revenue stream because it
has become an advertising vehicle as well as a programming
service. End-user fees, however, remain the most important source
of cable's revenue, with subscribers' spending more than $13
billion for cable, as compared to advertisers' $1.8 billion in
1990.23
The battle between broadcast stations and cable historically
has been a battle not over property rights in programming but over
audience-the broadcaster's perceived "end product" to be sold to
advertisers. As cable eroded broadcasters' audience share,
broadcasters began to perceive cable as a significant competitor
because audience share affects advertising revenue. Until recently,
the battle over programming copyrights had been between cable
systems and national program producers and suppliers. Broadcast-
ers viewed audience share, not property rights in programming, as
the value to be protected from cable.
Only after having lost the battle to keep cable systems from
fragmenting audiences have broadcasters come to view their
programming as a valuable, salable commodity. It is only now that
the property right in local programming has begun to take on a
value to broadcast stations as a source of revenue in and of itself.
Only because of cable retransmission of broadcast signals, which
provides a connection to consumers and a means of charging users
for programming, can broadcasters begin to consider charging
viewers who want more local news.
22. MARY ALICE MAYER PHILLIPS, CATV: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA
TELEVISION 7 (1972).
23. VERONIS, SUHLER, supra note 14, at 88.
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III. BROADCASTERS AND CABLE
During the FCC's freeze on television station licensing in the
late 1940s and early 1950s, community antenna television (CATV)
sprang up in areas that were not served by broadcast television.24
Therefore, early cable television systems had no adverse impact on
broadcasters. If anything, cable systems increased broadcast
audiences by bringing signals to otherwise unreachable viewers."
Viewers who lived in towns too small to support more than one
or two television stations began to subscribe to cable to increase
program choices with distant signals imported by cable operators
via microwave.26 Viewers in large cities were lured to cable by
the promise not only of better reception of local signals, but also
of alternatives to local broadcast fare. By the 1960s industry
observers predicted that cable would one day bring innovative new
services, including two-way communications. Many broadcasters
began to look at cable as a "real and present danger."'27
Broadcasters feared they would have to compete for local
viewers against an adversary that did not have to pay for pro-
grams.28 If cable systems imported distant signals, audiences
would be fragmented, and the rate the local broadcaster could
charge for advertising would drop. A few broadcasters tried
unsuccessfully in court to hold off cable's "unfair competition."29
Broadcasters produced relatively little of their own programming,
and most of what they did produce-local news-had no resale
market. Cable retransmission of copyrighted works was thus an
24. PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 50.
25. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CoNG., 2D SESS., CABLE TELEVISION: PROMISE VERSUS
REGULATORY PERFORMANCE 12 (Subcomm. Print 1976).
26. In re Amendment of Subpart L, Pt. 11, to Adopt Rules and Regs. to Govern the
Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay TV
Signals to Community Antenna Systems, First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, para.
65 (1965).
27. LES BROWN, TELEVISION: THE BUSINESS BEHIND THE Box 161 (1971).
28. Harvey Jassem, The Selling of the Cable TV Compromise, 17 J. BROADCASTING
427, 428 (1973).
29. See, e.g., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied sub nom. KLIX Corp. v. Cable Vision, Inc., 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
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issue primarily of concern to those who supplied the movies and
syndicated programs licensed to broadcasters. The copyright
holders' chances of selling their syndicated programs to small
market stations, at least at the price they were accustomed to
demanding for exclusive licensing, could be substantially reduced
if the programs had already been retransmitted to the market from
a distant station on a microwave-fed cable system. Therefore,
program suppliers, not broadcasters, first sought to protect the
value of their copyrights from being diluted by cable retransmis-
sion.
A. Retransmission Rights Under the 1909 Copyright Law
Fortnightly Corporation operated CATV systems in West
Virginia, providing subscribers in small mountain towns with
signals from West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio television
stations. The contracts between United Artists Television and the
stations whose signals Fortnightly retransmitted expressly forbade
cable distribution of the movies licensed for broadcast by the
stations." In 1960 United Artists sued Fortnightly."' Fortnightly
lost at trial and again on appeal.32 Then, surprisingly, the Su-
preme Court overturned the lower court decisions."3 The Supreme
Court decided Fortnightly was, like a television viewer, merely a
"passive beneficiary" of broadcasters' licensed performance of
copyrighted works. 4 Copyright holders could be protected
against reception for profit by cable only if Congress changed the
copyright law.3" Under the 1909 copyright law, 6 which pre-
dated cable by some forty years, cable systems performing their
30. United Artists TV, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd, 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
31. Fortnightly, 255 F. Supp. 177.
32. United Artists TV, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd,
392 U.S. 390 (1968).
33. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists TV, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
34. Id. at 399.
35. Id. at 401.
36. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, superseded by Copyrights Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1010 (1988)).
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"historic role" had an implied-in-law license to retransmit works
already licensed to broadcasters.37
If cable systems performing in their "historic" role were not
infringing copyrights, what about large systems providing more
than local antenna service? Another copyright suit had been
brought against the nation's largest multiple cable system operator
(MSO) while Fortnightly was pending in the same district. 31
After an unsuccessful attempt to consolidate the two cases, the
parties in the other case, CBS, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp.,39
agreed to a stay pending a final disposition of Fortnightly.4"
CBS named five of Teleprompter's many cable systems as
defendants in the complaint. The systems were in communities as
disparate as New York City and Rawlins, Wyoming.41 The court
was asked to decide whether an MSO the size of Teleprompter
was a "performer" under the 1909 copyright law.42
Unlike Fortnightly, Teleprompter systems made varying uses
of microwave links to import programming from distant markets
to many of their cable systems.43 The trial court said that even
importing distant signals did not make Teleprompter a per-
former.' The court of appeals disagreed, finding that importing
distant signals was a copyright violation.45 But the Supreme
Court proved as conservative as the court of appeals had been
"imaginative. '" 6  It found no "copyright significance" in
Teleprompter's distant signal importation.
37. Alan P- Chase, Comment, The Copyright Law and Its Relevance to CATV: Can
an Old Dog Be Taught New Tricks, 19 BUFF. L. REV. 65, 79 (1969).
38. CBS, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 355 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 476
F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 620.
41. Id. at 619.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 621-24.
44. Id. at 630.
45. CBS, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 415
U.S. 394 (1974).
46. Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 416 (1974) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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Even in exercising its limited freedom to choose among various
broadcasting stations, a CATV operator simply cannot be viewed as
"selecting," "procuring," or "propagating" broadcast signals as those
terms were used in Fortnightly .... The electronic signals it
receives and rechannels have already been "released to the public"
even though they may not be normally available to the specific
segment of the public served by the CATV system.47
In short, whatever the size or nature of the cable operator, under
the 1909 statute it did not infringe a copyright merely by retrans-
mitting broadcast signals. "Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not
perform."4 Neither did cable. Like home viewers, cable systems
merely "received."
The Supreme Court's characterization of broadcasters'
"releasing their programming" to the public no doubt reflected the
lack of importance broadcasters attached to protecting their
copyrights in local programs. Just the opposite, the value of
broadcast programming was its ability to be received free of
charge and without subscription by anyone with a television set.
At the time of the Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions, local
television news had not evolved into the profit center it would
later become. Most broadcasters did not envision the viability of
all-news radio and the Cable News Network in the fragmented
media market that would evolve in the decades to come. Even if
they had, television, unlike radio and cable services, played a
ratings game in which local news had a growing, but limited,
draw.49
The question of whether distant signal importation reduced
the resale value of programming was relegated to a footnote in
both the court of appeals and Supreme Court Teleprompter
opinions. The Supreme Court felt that findings of fact concerning
losses to copyright owners would be of "little relevance."50 It
presumed that broadcasters whose signals were picked up for cable
retransmission in distant markets would be compensated by
47. Id. at 410.
48. Id. at 403.
49. See Jeff Greenfield, Making TV News Pay, GANNETT CENTER J., Spring 1987,
at 21, 29-33.
50. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 413 n.15.
[Vol. 46
RETRSMISSION CONSENT
advertisers for distant viewers and would in turn pay copyright
owners more for programs.5 The court of appeals noted that
while no evidence of losses to copyright owners had been
produced at trial, "common sense would impel one to an opposite
conclusion."52 The courts showed no inclination whatsoever to
consider the possibility that cable (the question of its impact on
program resale to broadcasters aside) might represent an additional
source of revenue to broadcast program copyright holders.
In light of the Supreme Court's characterization of broad-
casters "releasing" programming, the notion that broadcasters
would suffer economic loss as a result of cable's infringement of
a "property right" in local programming would have seemed
absurd. If broadcast stations took an interest in the copyright issue,
it was because they saw the prospect of bringing about the death
of distant signal importation by forcing cable systems to negotiate
with syndicators for the right to import distant signals. In so
doing, they would nip the threat of audience fragmentation in the
bud.
B. The Battle over Audience
Meanwhile, the FCC was proving a far more receptive forum
for broadcasters trying to stave off audience fragmentation due to
cable competition. Over the years, the protectionist FCC was to
assume "a veritable Kama Sutra of regulatory positions"53
concerning cable-all of them aimed at preventing broadcasters
from losing audiences to distant signal importation.
In the early days, when CATV merely enhanced local
reception, the FCC refused to take jurisdiction over cable.54
Later, the Commission decided to regulate cable systems that
51. Id. at 412.
52. CBS, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 342 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd,
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
53. Michael Botein, The New Copyright Act and Cable Television-A Signal of
Change, 24 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 1, 3 (1976).
54. In re Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Sys. on the Orderly
Development of TV Brdcst., Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, paras. 58-71 (1959).
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imported distant signals by microwave feed.5 In 1966 the FCC
took ancillary jurisdiction over all cable systems, claiming that
cable's "unregulated explosive growth"56 could degrade local
broadcast service.57
In the interest of protecting local service, the FCC "slapped
a virtual freeze on cable"58 by prohibiting systems in major
markets from carrying distant signals unless they could show that
such service "would be consistent with the public interest, and
specifically the establishment and healthy maintenance of
television broadcast service in the area. 59
C. Retransmission Consent Proposed, 1968
In 1968 the Commission proposed an alternative: cable
systems would not have to make such a public interest showing if
they could obtain retransmission consent from the stations whose
signals would be imported into distant markets by cable sys-
tems.6 ' The Commission claimed that requiring retransmission
consent would prevent "unfair competition" between cable and
local broadcasters, especially the emerging UHF stations in major
markets.61 Such consent requirements probably would have
prevented any competition at all from cable systems. In the
55. In re Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Serv. for Microwave
Stations to Relay TV Signals to Community Antenna Sys., First Report and Order, 38
F.C.C. 683, para. 4 (1965).
56. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 175 (1968) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966)).
57. In re Amendment of Subpart L, Pt. 21, to Adopt Rules and Regs. to Govern the
Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay TV
Signals to Community Antenna Sys., Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, para.
25 (1966) [hereinafter CATV Second Report and Order].
58. Botein, supra note 53, at 3.
59. CATV Second Report and Order, supra note 57, at 804 [hereinafter Cable TV
Report and Order] (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 74.1107(a), repealed, In re Amendment of
Pt. 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regs. Relative to Community Antenna
TV Sys., Cable TV Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 212 (1972)).
60. In re Amendment of Pt. 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regs.
Relative to Community Antenna TV Sys., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice
of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, para. 38 (1968).
61. Id.
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anti-cable climate then prevailing, it is doubtful any broadcast
station would have consented to retransmission of its signal. 2
The aim of the FCC's proposal did not seem to be to allow
broadcasters to bargain over the value of their programming, but
to give broadcasters a tool to prevent distant signal importation.
IV. COMPROMISE AND COPYRIGHT REVISION
Only after cable operators agreed to support copyright law
revision did the FCC adopt rules allowing cable to grow. 3
According to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the purpose
of granting Congress power to make copyright laws is to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 6" Thus, copyright law
is intended to strike a balance between creators' rights to profit
from their creations and society's right to benefit from access to
those creative works. When Congress revised the copyright law in
1976,65 it tipped the scales on the side of access for cable. It
created a solution aimed at imposing some copyright liability on
cable television while protecting the cable industry and its
subscribers against concerted obstruction from broadcasters or the
potentially crushing license fees and transaction costs of negotiat-
ing for the right to retransmit broadcast signals. However, while
copyright holders were for the first time given the right to some
compensation for cable retransmission,66 the law gave neither
broadcasters nor copyright holders the ability to prevent cable
systems from retransmitting broadcast signals or to negotiate a
mutually agreeable price for cable's use of copyrighted broadcasts.
Instead, the law allowed cable systems to obtain a compulsory
license to retransmit television signals in exchange for a license
fee collected and distributed by the government.67
62. Botein, supra note 53, at 4.
63. See generally Cable TV Report and Order, supra note 59.
64. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
65. Copyrights Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 111, 90 Stat. 2541, 2550
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1988)).
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(3)(A) (1988); 2 DAvID NMMER & MELViLLE B.
NmmmR, NwIER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18[E][4][d][i] (1993).
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1988); 2 NMMER & NIMMER, supra note 66,
§ 8.18[E][4][c].
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The compulsory license charges cable systems for retransmit-
ting distant, non-network programming.68 For retransmitting these
signals, cable systems pay a percentage of their gross receipts69
multiplied by the number of "distant signal equivalents" they
carry.70 Distant network and non-commercial educational stations
cost only one-fourth as much as distant independents.71
The copyright law revision presumed that owners of
copyrights in local television programs and in network programs
did not deserve compensation for retransmission by cable systems.
In the case of local programming, the cable system was seen as
doing no more than bringing the local signal to those local
residents who could receive the signal over the air, or to those
local viewers who would otherwise not get the signal because of
interference. In other words, cable retransmission was seen as
having no effect or creating a positive effect on the local station
rather than diminishing the local station's ability to profit from its
intellectual property. Because network programming already has
been released for national broadcast, it too was treated by the
copyright law as undiminished by cable retransmission.
By setting the payment for distant network affiliates at
one-fourth the amount paid for distant independents under the
compulsory license scheme, the law sought to compensate merely
for the portion of the distant affiliate's broadcast schedule that
could be presumed to be made up of syndicated programs.72 The
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(3)(A), (f) (1988) (definition of "local service area" and
"network station"); National Ass'n of Brdcsts. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d
367, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The [Copyrights] Act was not intended to compensate
network broadcasters or even local broadcasters whose programs are retransmitted locally
by a cable system in the same area."); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 66, § 8.18[E][4][b][ii].
69. For the current percentage rates promulgated by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal,
see 37 C.F.R. § 308.2 (1993).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 11l(d)(1)(B), (f) (1988) (definition of "distant signal equivalent");
2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 66, § 8.18[E][4][b][ii] (discussing the computation of
a compulsory license charge).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (1988); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 66,
§ 8.18[E][4][b][ii].
72. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5705; 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 66, § 8.18[E][4][b][ii].
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compulsory license fee was fashioned to take into account cable
systems and cable uses that arguably actually benefited broadcast-
ers by increasing local audiences and did nothing to reduce the
resale value of syndicated programming to other markets.
Otherwise, it was argued, broadcasters and networks would receive
an unwarranted "double payment. ' 7 3
In the battle leading to the revision of the copyright law,
broadcast stations had fought to protect their interest in maintain-
ing local audiences rather than for copyright protection of locally
produced programs. Copyright law had been viewed as a means
to prevent cable systems from importing distant signals rather than
a method for collecting payment for cable's use of broadcast
programming. The question of how to protect copyright for local
broadcast productions was never seriously at issue. Neither was
the idea that cable operators should pay for broadcast signals
because of the value the signals represented to end-users. That
cable operators received value from broadcasters by extending
their programs to paying customers as much as it added value to
their broadcasts by amplifying their signals never seems to have
been seriously considered by either side.
V. SECOND THOUGHTS ON COMPULSORY LICENSING
The compulsory license for cable seemed an expedient
solution to the complex problems posed by the infant cable
industry of the early 1970s. The drafters of the 1976 law were
optimistic that the compulsory license was flexible enough to
serve through the end of the century.74 Critics of the compulsory
license, however, viewed it as an unwarranted subversion of the
free market system.75 In fact, the revised copyright law had
73. 2 NIMMR & NnIaMMR, supra note 66, § 8.18[E][4][a].
74. Thomas C. Brennan, Some Observations on the Revision of the Copyright Law
from the Legislative Point of View, 24 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 151, 153 (1976).
75. Henry Geller, who served on the FCC staff when retransmission consent was
proposed in 1968 and headed the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) when it proposed replacing the compulsory license with
retransmission consent in 1979, noted the unfairness of U-F stations' disrupting the
conventional marketing system for broadcast syndicated programs. Geller and His
Retransmission Consent Get Raked over Cable's Coals, BROADCASTING, May 28, 1979,
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scarcely taken effect when proposals to force cable to obtain
retransmission consent for the use of broadcast programming once
again surfaced. By the late 1970s both Congress76 and the
executive branch77 had proposed phasing out or eliminating the
compulsory license scheme and substituting a retransmission
consent requirement.
In the 1980s as the cable industry flourished (and broadcast
stations and networks faced audience erosion), the call to force
cable to pay for broadcast programming-local and network-
became louder. Broadcasters looked at cable's healthy end-user
revenues, which were due in large part to subscribers' viewing of
broadcast signals, and demanded that these revenues be shared.
For the first time broadcasters seemed seriously to consider that
they contributed to cable's ability to attract subscribers because of
the value of broadcast programs. Also, for the first time commer-
cial broadcasters looked at their programming as a product to be
sold to end-users, rather than as a vehicle to be used to attract
audiences for advertisers.
A. The Cable Industry, 1992
In the years after the compulsory license scheme became law,
the cable industry was transformed by technological advanc-
es-most importantly the satellite transmission of program-
ming-and by deregulation.
In 1976 cable reached fewer than eleven million subscrib-
ers. There were only about six hundred thousand pay cable
households,79 and total cable revenues were less than $1 bil-
at 38, 42. Some of the complaints came from major market independents themselves,
who claimed they were being transformed into superstations against their will and were
being pressured for higher syndication license fees as a result. Metromedia and NAB Hit
the FCC Panic Button over Superstations, BROADCASTING, Mar. 26, 1979, at 62, 62.
76. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 453 (1979).
77. In re Cable TV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004, paras. 5, 67-72, 126 (1979).
78. Cable Almost Brought in a Billion in '76, BROADCASTING, June 26, 1978, at 25,
26.
79. Cable in 1978: About to Break $1-Billion Barrier, BROADCASTING, May 1, 1978,
at 25, 25.
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lion.80 By 1990 more than fifty-one million households sub-
scribed to cable,81 and 29.5 million households had pay cable.82
Cable advertising revenue and end-user payments were over $15
billion. By 1995 total spending by subscribers and advertisers
is predicted to be $22.4 billion per year.84 "Cable has evolved
into a mature, established industry."
85
When the compulsory license scheme was fashioned, there
were no such things as superstations and satellite-delivered basic
cable networks. By 1990 basic cable and premium cable services
had a combined share of almost 24 percent of television view-
ing;86 by 1995 their combined share is predicted to reach more
than 29 percent.8 7 Over the years, many FCC restrictions disap-
peared,88 and cable rates were deregulated.
B. The Cable Act of 1992
Consumer outrage over rising cable rates and poor customer
service focused congressional attention once again on the cable
industry and its relationship with its customers and competitors.
Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act90 over a presidential veto shortly before the
80. Id.
81. VERONIS, SU-LER, supra note 14, at 89.
82. Id. at 90.
83. Id. at 96.
84. Id. at 104.
85. Id. at 88.
86. Id. at 93.
87. Id. at 101.
88. Some FCC cable regulations were successfully challenged in court. For example,
courts overturned the Commission's attempts to mandate access channels, FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979), and to regulate pay cable, Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). The FCC
did away with other rules on its own initiative; the requirement that cable systems obtain
certificates of compliance from the FCC Cable Bureau before beginning operation is one
example. In re Amendment of Pt. 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regs. Concerning
Cable TV Certificate of Compliance Process, Report and Order, 69 F.C.C.2d 697 (1978).
89. See generally, Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549,
98 Stat. 2779 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
90. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-611
(West Supp. 1994)).
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election in 1992 9 1-a testament to the political popularity of
cable regulation.
Under the new law, broadcasters may opt for either must-
carry or retransmission consent.92 Stations may demand the safety
of assured carriage on local cable systems or take the risky, but
potentially profitable, course of negotiating with the cable operator
for payment in return for the right to retransmit the station's
signal.93 While the Cable Act of 1992 does not repeal the
compulsory license for importation of distant signals, for the first
time it gives broadcasters the right to decide whether to allow
local cable systems to retransmit their signals and the right to
negotiate a price for the value the signals bring to cable.94
Much of the talk of broadcasters getting paid for the
retransmission of their signals has proven to be wishful thinking.
There is truth to the argument that cable retransmission of
broadcast signals enhances the value of local and network
programs by improving reception. In that sense, broadcasters have
already been paid in the only way they could traditionally expect
payment-by becoming more attractive to audiences and adver-
tisers. Stations that create little of their own programming have
little to sell to cable systems. For broadcasters relying heavily on
network or syndicated fare, the value of being carried on the cable
system may sufficiently compensate the broadcaster for any
marginal value that its own programming contributes to the cable
system's ability to draw subscribers. Particularly in small markets,
must-carry appears to be the route many stations have taken in the
first round of negotiations. 95
But under the Cable Act of 1992 and the FCC's regulations,
each station will have the opportunity to reconsider its option
91. On October 5, 1992, the U.S. Senate voted 74-25 to override the veto. 138
CONG. REC. S16,676 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992). The U.S. House of Representatives voted
308-114 to override the veto. 138 CONG. REc. Hl1,487-88 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
92. 47 U.S.C.A. § 325(b)(1) (West Supp. 1994).
93. 47 U.S.C.A. § 536(a) (West Supp. 1994).
94. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 325(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1994).
95. See Jim Cooper, Free Ad Time Enters Retrans Negotiations, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, June 28, 1993, at 38, 38.
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every three years.96 A broadcaster offering something more than
syndicated or network programming stands a good chance of
tapping cable's end-user revenue stream. Thus, retransmission
consent-and its potential for creating a dual revenue stream for
broadcasters-could be a commercial incentive to produce
substantially more local programming. In television, "local"
translates into news, sports, and information; entertainment has
traditionally been more economically produced for national
distribution.
VI. COPYRIGHT AS AN INCENTIVE TO MAKE LOCAL
NEWS PROGRAMMING
Cable subscribers, like other television viewers, want access
to local television news. A relatively small group of subscribers
look to cable as a way of obtaining, at a price, specialized
programming including news and community information. A
television station positioned as a local news station has
"must-have" leverage with the cable system regardless of the
must-carry regulations. It brings to the bargaining table a com-
modity that cannot be replaced, at any price, with distant signals
or national cable networks.
Not surprisingly, many of the 1993 negotiations over
retransmission consent have involved space for new cable channels
devoted to local news and information.97 One deal, for example,
gives Cox Enterprises's Pittsburgh station, WPXI (TV), the ability
to program a local news and information channel that General
Manager John Howell says he has hoped for five years to
begin.9" The Pittsburgh venture will be a partnership from which
both cable operator and television station hope to profit.99
96. 47 U.S.C.A. § 325(b)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1994); see also In re Implementation
of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Brdcst. Signal
Carriage Issues, Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 2965, para. 2 (1993).
97. Steve McClellan, Retrans Plans: Programming the New Channels, BROADCAST-
ING & CABLE, Oct. 11, 1993, at 16, 16.
98. Joe Flint, A Broadcaster Gets a Cable Channel, BROADCASTING & CABLE, June
21, 1993, at 7, 7.
99. Id.
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Broadcasters trading retransmission consent for cable channel
space are most likely to profit if they already produce substantial
local news programs and can, in the short term, rely on time
shifting. °0 In the long term, broadcasters and cable systems may
find new and profitable partnerships in which broadcasters provide
the content and cable operators provide the delivery systems for
innovative, "niche" news programs that do not rely on ratings as
the key to profitability.10 1 The chronic characterization of broad-
cast news as a headline service of the sensational and the trivial
may change as well, as stations focus on in-depth reporting that
can feed and re-feed a second all-news channel.
Moreover, strong local news will give television stations
greater ability to protect any cable compensation they receive from
program syndicators and networks. Syndicators and networks
certainly will demand a chunk of any retransmission compensation
local stations get from cable-if not directly, then indirectly as
future license fees and affiliation agreements are negotiated. But
to the extent that local stations create more of their own program-
ming, they will keep more of the benefits that local news
programs, not network or syndicated programs, rightly earn from
cable retransmission compensation.
In 1992 WSVN, Channel 7, Miami, Florida, became the first
independent station to beat its network-owned and affiliated
competition in both early and late news ratings. 1 2 WSVN, a
former NBC affiliate, became an independent in January 1989,
after NBC and CBS purchased stations in Miami and WSVN was
left without a network affiliation. The station opted to become
"South Florida's News Station" and survived the switch.10 3
While Fox affiliation certainly helps WSVN, the station positions
itself foremost as a local news station. Featuring a style different
100. Joe Flint, Programming That Second Channel, BROADCASTING & CABLE, June
28, 1993, at 19, 19-20.
101. See Geoffrey Foisie, Casting About for News Cost Controls, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, June 7, 1993, at 85.
102. Interview with Robert Holtzer, Sales, Marketing, and Research Director, WSVN,
Miami, in North Miami, Fla. (Mar. 11, 1993).
103. Id.
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from traditional news programs, WSVN employs a controversial
approach skewed to young viewers that gives the station an edge
with advertisers seeking to target that attractive demographic
group.- 4 Thus, WSVN wields bargaining power vis-ii-vis not
only cable systems, but also Fox, whose affiliation agreements
with generally news-poor independents have given Fox the power
to use retransmission consent negotiations on behalf of its
affiliates to bargain for a new cable channel for itself.lOS
CONCLUSION
The balance has shifted, and cable is no longer as needy as
it seemed in 1976-nor are broadcasters as secure. As broadcasters
and cable battle over the terms of their new relationship, the
survival of local stations will once again be an issue. To the extent
that lawmakers allow market forces to dictate the respective
property rights in programming, they may better serve the public
interest in local news and information programming than has any
previous attempt to achieve those same goals through direct
regulation.
With retransmission consent now part of the law, it seems
appropriate to revisit the question of copyright liability for cable.
If cable systems are now required to negotiate with every local
television station they carry, there is little justification to support
different treatment for cable's carriage of distant signals. The
compulsory license system was aimed at giving cable breathing
room and preventing cable from being strangled at birth by
cumbersome negotiations with hostile broadcast stations.
Cable demonstrated its bargaining strength in the initial
retransmission consent negotiations. If it is at all possible for cable
systems to bargain with the many local stations they carry, then it
is certainly possible for them to bargain with a few distant
stations. There seems little reason to give cable systems a break
on the fees they pay for distant signals. Retaining a lopsided
104. Id.
105. See Joe Flint, Affiliates Approve Fox's Cable Network, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, June 7, 1993, at 16, 16.
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system that regulates the fees cable systems pay for distant
signals, while letting the marketplace dictate fees or other
arrangements for retransmitting local signals, simply does not
make sense anymore-even if it did when Congress revised the
copyright law in 1976.
Moreover, by giving cable systems a bargain on distant
signals, the compulsory license laws may impose artificial barriers
for local stations negotiating for payment for their signals. If
broadcasters are to compete in selling their programs to cable
systems, they need to compete on a level playing field. The
government need not dictate license fees for distant signals any
more than it need dictate retransmission consent fees. Cable
systems and broadcasters are now capable of negotiating both.
"I believe that most of television's problems stem from lack
of competition," said FCC Chairman Newton Minow in 1961.'06
The forum was the annual convention of the National Association
of Broadcasters; Minow's speech would live in history (or infamy)
for its characterization of television programming as a "vast
wasteland., 10 7 It was an exhortation to community service that
did not play well to the broadcasters listening more than thirty
years ago. And it might not play any better today to a broadcast
industry beset by competition for audience and advertisers. Yet
broadcasters may come to see that Minow was right after all. The
competition of which Minow only dreamed-he spoke of the
"experiments" then ongoing with "the infant pay TV" and
UIIFM8 -may deliver the industry and its audience out of the
wasteland and into a new abundance of local programming.
106. Newton Minow, The "Vast Wasteland," Address Before the Nat'l Assoc. of
Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), in How VAST THE WASTELAND Now? 31 (Gannett Found.
Media Ctr. ed., 1991).
107. Id. at 24.
108. Id. at 30.
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